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Abstract 
Ports and terminals are considered critical infrastructure with higher protection requirements 
for an effective and efficient operation. This research introduces a security enhancement 
architectural framework for the specific case of port and port terminal facilities’ passenger 
traffic, combining two different attributes, the cyber and the physical, and operationally 
integrating the proposed subsystem to the Port Community System. More precisely, this 
paper identifies, introduces and analyses a system that supports risk management by 
developing and validating a security framework which is based on monitoring access through 
Automated Border Control (ABC) structures aimed at ports and terminals. Additionally, the 
modular prototype developed, enhances the information sharing capabilities of the Port 
Community Systems in a way that improves collaboration for security related procedures, 
based on existing and easy to develop software capabilities. The architectural framework is 
validated by domain experts through semi-structured interview workshop improving the 
robustness of the top-down model for the design and the implementation of a risk 
management approach based on improved communication sharing and utilizing advanced 
equipment. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
Ports and terminals represent an important element in maritime supply chains. Their 
criticality stems from economic, commercial and security aspects, not only for the 
local but also for the national economy. This criticality is especially important due to 
the current changes on the global economy as well as to the global security concerns. 
This environment pushes port operators to implement reliable and trustworthy e-
maritime services in order to improve their efficiency, increase the quality of service 
and increase revenues. 
The range of threats is massive and is increasing. The ports, the terminal facilities and 
the critical infrastructure in general are becoming an “affordable target”. From 
economic crimes like tax avoidance and smuggling to carrying weapons of mass 
destruction, to attacking Liquefied Gas Carrier Vessels or to cyber-attacks that may 
put an entire regional government to its knees, the extent of consequences arising out 
of a security incident may be undesirably high. Burns (Burns, 2013) measured the 
economic losses from a hypothetical attack on the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach at 
0.5 billion USD only for the first week following the attack. To this extent, Ernst & 
Young’s 2012 Global Information Security Survey (Ernst & Young, 2012) and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 2012 Information Security Breaches Survey 
(PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2013) identified a significant increase in the number of 
cyber-threats, breaches of high-profile security systems and shut down of e-services 
all having a direct economic impact. 
Current responses to improving the security of a port or a terminal facility include both 
governmental initiatives, for example the US DoHS (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2005) initiative to collect, analyse and fuse information to relevant 
stakeholders, EU’s initiative to assign specific roles to certain authorities and 
stakeholders (European Commission, 2013), like the EU’s definition of the Authorized 
Economic Operator (European Parliament, 2013) as well as industrial led initiatives 
like ISO 31000 and ISO 28000 among others. A number of cross governmental 
initiatives have also been set up, including the Customs Trade Partnership against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT), the World Customs Organization (WCO) Framework of Standards 
to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program 
led by U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Global Container Control Program 
(CCP), a joint United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/World Customs 
Organization (WCO) initiative, the Global Trade Exchange, the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), etc.  
These attempts intend to enhance port security and to complement the already 
implemented strict monitoring guidelines, but at the same time to reduce both 
compliance costs and red tape. Strict rules, like 100% scanning in physical inspections, 
do not individually ensure improved security but are beneficial only as a part of an 
extended security framework. Due to the massiveness of the port area, unauthorized 
access becomes an even more imminent danger, which has to be sufficiently 
addressed.   
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This article complements existing academic and industrial literature by introducing a 
security enhancement framework for the specific case of port and port terminal 
facilities’ passenger traffic. The proposed framework combines two different 
attributes that most commercial ports have, the cyber and the physical characteristic, 
by becoming an integrated subsystem of the Port Community System (PCS). By 
developing and validating a security framework based on Automated Border Control 
(ABC) systems as the main control of these physical threats and their interaction with 
the PCS, the cyber threats, the study goes a step further in identifying, introducing and 
analysing a systematic cyber-physical framework to support port access risk 
management. Additionally, the proposed framework sets up a methodology that 
enables real-time, multisource information capturing and sharing of potential threats 
and their respective vulnerabilities. Last but not least, this paper provides feedback 
captured through a validation workshop that was held with Port Facility Security 
Officers (PFSOs) from five ports acting as test beds. 
1.2 Literature review 
Port security is currently being revisited, not only due to the increasing significance of 
the role of the ports in global commerce but also due to the repercussions to the local, 
regional and national context of security incidents in lieu of an increasingly complex 
threat environment. Current approaches to risk management and to port security, 
based primarily on probabilistic assumptions, have resulted in isolated and 
inconsistent risk mitigation frameworks with certain but limited applicability. 
Unauthorized access of a physical facility, including data centres, terminals, cruise 
terminal gateways and waiting areas has been recognized as one of the most 
significant threats. This threat may well exploit vulnerable sub-systems of the port 
damaging either the physical or the cyber assets or even putting the port’s operation 
at risk. A port operator handles a very large number of persons and vehicles at any 
given time, transiting through or entering the port’s respective catchment area. In 
order for this not to constitute a violation of access control, authentication and 
authorization of entrants should be performed on a regular basis and based on specific 
procedures.  
Recent security incidents (the Cyprus Mari Port container blast, the Voltri Terminal 
Europa container emitting radiation, and numerous other post September 11, 2001 
incidents) require stricter port security rules based not only on economic or financial 
aspects but equally importantly on security criteria, including strict security controls 
and implementation of safety and security procedures. Similarly, cyber-attack counter 
measures is also considered in this respect as a precaution of these incidents. US Navy 
Rear Admiral Thomas (Thomas, 2017) indicates that a certain number of ports still lag 
behind in technology adoption vis-à-vis these measures. Automated Border Control 
(ABC) Systems, is an appropriate security control for preventing the non-authorised 
access, controlling and authenticating related threats of passengers, vehicles and 
freight. This paper is devoted to developing a security framework based on ABC 
systems as the main control of these threats and their interaction with the Port 
Community Systems (PCS).   
Relevant literature has identified a number of papers proposing and testing 
theoretical risk assessment frameworks. For example, Williams (Williams, 2015) 
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introduces the “System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process” (STAMP) as a new 
model of causality, based on systems and on control theory which identifies specific 
technical or procedural security requirements by using a System Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA), thus developing port security design specifications that mitigate 
vulnerabilities. Similarly, analytical approaches to port security (Akhtar, Bjørnskau, & 
Veistein, 2010), (Ghafoori & Altiok, 2012), (Bakshi & Gans, 2010) seek to minimize the 
product of (a) the probability of a threat, (b) the probability of a vulnerability and/or 
(c) the expected value of losses / consequences. Furthermore, a stream of 
econometric models also analyse the optimal allocation (Burns, 2013) of security 
resources across supply chains composed of an ever widening disparity of socio-
economically successful countries. Many researchers have focused on the physical 
security of the ports, including access control measures, risk management and vessel 
safety (Luiijf, Burger, & Klaver, 2003) or on Threat and Vulnerability Assessment 
methods (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001).  
With respect to the PCSs, previous studies investigated PCSs with a particular 
attention on the relationships among private and public entities (Bagchi & Paik, 2001) 
or on the process of implementing a PCS (Rodon & Ramis-Pujol, 2006) or even on the 
architectural attributes of the underlying information systems (van Baalen, Zuidwijk, 
& van Nunen, 2009), (Koliousis, Koliousis, & Katsoulakos, 2015). Interoperability issues 
among PCSs at the EU level have also been researched, e.g. Baron (Baron & Mathieu, 
2013) stressed that PCS operators are becoming key actors in the maritime supply 
chain. This literature review suggests that a PCS plays a pivotal role among different 
supply chain actors including customs and public agencies, business partners and 
ports, which necessitates the efficient information sharing to ensure improved 
collaboration. This paper will study this issue of information sharing at the specific 
level of sharing security related information.  
1.3 Knowledge management as the basis of PCSs 
In order to effectively secure the transport chain, entities have to control their existing 
security related knowledge, use it and additionally create new knowledge that will 
enable them to successfully address potential threats. Knowledge Management (KM) 
is an approach that utilizes existing experiences and information in an attempt to 
utilize and create new knowledge. Polyani, (Polyani, 1966) differentiated knowledge 
between tacit and explicit whereas Duffy (Duffy, 2000) explained that explicit 
knowledge’s key characteristics include documentation, public status, structure, 
defined content and consciousness. Explicit knowledge may be captured and shared 
through information technology; to the contrary, tacit knowledge resides (Duffy, 
2000) in the human mind, behaviour, and perception and evolves from human 
interactions. This paper adopts that explicit knowledge is more appropriate for 
addressing security related objectives. 
KM is a process that identifies, collects, stores and disseminates tacit and explicit 
information to stakeholders. A wide spectrum of tools is used in this process to 
support and enable KM and several methods and applications have been proposed. 
The main categorization is between organizational, ecological, and technological KM. 
Organizational KM theory focuses on organizational structures and organizational 
design. Ecological KM theory focuses on people, relationships, and learning 
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communities. Technological KM theory, which is the primary motivation of this paper, 
focuses on technology and the process of designing knowledge related flows.  
Knowledge capturing techniques include content submission, regular training and 
personal development. This study follows Easterby – Smith and Lyles (Easterby-Smith 
& Lyles, 2003) who differentiate Organizational Learning, OL, from KM. The latter 
focuses strictly on the procedural aspects (being the ultimate goal of KM), whereas 
KM focuses on the content of knowledge and more precisely on its acquisition, 
creation and dissemination. This distinction helps firstly develop the port security 
management systems and as a second step, enhance the security related knowledge 
content. According to King (King, 2009) the knowledge process cycle includes certain 
activities starting from the KM initiation through to improving the organizational 
capabilities and performance (as depicted on Figure 1). Additionally, this paper builds 
on push KM strategies, as defined by Batini et.al (Batini, Lenzerini, & Navathe, 1986) 
and by Rishe et. al. (Rishe, Athauda, Yuan, & Chen, 2000), who disseminate knowledge 
through shared repositories. The two main theoretical premises for knowledge 
sharing repositories (Hansen, Mors, & LØVÅS, 2005) are (a) knowledge codification, 
the collecting and storing of accessible knowledge for both tacit and explicit items, 
and (b) personalization, the individually shared knowledge. Relevant tools that 
support KM and stimulate this research include storytelling, after-action reviews, 
practice communities, best practice transfer, knowledge fairs and collaborative 
software among others. 
 
Figure 1 - KM in an organization (Source: adapted from (King, 2009) and (Bhatt, 2001)) 
 
1.4 Research objective and methodology 
Based on this literature review, traditional port security approaches are 
predominantly focused on security regulations and compliance, instead of relying on 
system flexibility, on information sharing and on using advanced technologies and 
techniques. The frameworks reviewed in most of the cases work well but are isolated 
and thus, the exploiting of inherent vulnerabilities may prove easier. The proposed 
framework integrates a targeted risk management approach to an existing system, the 
Port Community System – PCS, and relying on advanced monitoring technologies, 
checks real time (unauthorized) access as well as shares this information across a 
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entities. The ports as basic components of critical infrastructure benefit from an 
improved system through a 3-Step Approach:  
 Step I: Infrastructural Upgrade 
 Step II: Procedural Upgrade 
 Step III: Knowledge Upgrade 
Each step is presented in Section 2 (Access control: Effectiveness upgrade through ABC 
systems), in Section 3 (Procedural Upgrade ) and in Section 3.5 (Knowledge Upgrade). 
The ultimate goal is to improve the operational efficiency and at the same time 
improve the security effectiveness. 
The methodology used is a case study approach validating a proposed framework in 
five ports whose security needs have significantly grown over the recent years. More 
specifically, through a semi-structured interview session with Port Facility Security 
Officers, PFSOs, (at the director’s level or similar decision making authority) the 
applicability and the value of this framework are investigated. As a result, a top-down 
model for the design and the implementation of a risk management approach is 
presented based on improved communication sharing and utilizing advanced 
equipment. 
2 Access control: Effectiveness upgrade through ABC systems 
2.1 Overview  
Unauthorized access in port and in container terminal facilities (whether physical or 
cyber) is a threat with a high impact causing significant security risks. The ABC systems 
are an acknowledged control that prevents such risks, especially in port related 
operational environments. An ABC System is intended for passenger traffic and is 
based on the biometric identification of the passenger using a biometric-enabled 
identification (e.g. a passport) enclosing a microchip. This microchip contains 
information which is checked by the automatic device’s readers. In addition, the 
system compares the unique proportions of a real-time facial image to the image on 
the passport's chip. 
The first ports in Europe that adopted such systems were the Finnish ones, with the 
Finnish Border Guard extending the use of automatic border control devices to the 
maritime border crossing point in the West Terminal of the Port of Helsinki. The Port 
Authority (PA) set up three automatic devices which are expected to increase 
efficiency by speeding up the border crossing times at the terminal. Following up the 
trend, the Spanish Ports Authority (Puertos del Estado) has been piloting since 2012 
ABCs in certain Spanish ports.  
The state of play in the Finnish Ports covers persons entering the Finnish sea borders, 
who possess a valid biometric passport. These entrants are eligible to use the ABC 
devices in Helsinki West Harbor (Port of Helsinki, 2016) for the border control both in- 
and outbound. It was planned that by September 2016, all Finns should be using 
biometric passports compared to 2017, when all EU citizens should be using only 
biometric passports. The citizens of the European Union (EU), of the European 
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Economic Area (EEA) and of Switzerland who possess a biometric passport can use the 
ABC Gateways. People travelling in a wheelchair or with an infant must still pass 
through the traditional border control. The Finnish Border Guard's goal is to be a 
pioneer in the use of automatic devices for border control. The Border Guard has been 
using automatic border control devices at the Helsinki-Vantaa Airport since 2008. For 
comparison purposes, 25 border control devices at the Helsinki-Vantaa Airport have 
an annual throughput of about 300,000. 
Commercial insight (Future Travel Experience, 2011) complements experience and 
reveals that ports are not as advanced as anticipated, especially compared to airports. 
For example, the Malaysian ports have been piloting ABC systems in addition to 
Taiwan’s local government authorities who have begun (as early as 2011) trialling ABC 
systems (Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Immigration Agency). 
In this context, ABCs were trialled at the Shuitou port in Kinmen, in Taiwan Taoyuan 
international airport, in Taipei Songshan airport and in Kaohsiung international 
airport.  
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) has provisions for border 
control and ports are heavily relying on manual inspections. However, the modern 
business and operational requirements call for upgrades and the new automated 
systems can increase value both for port operators and for users, who require efficient 
security controls. These ABC systems can be extended both for passenger and freight 
flows to include fast and flexible control tools for monitoring passenger and vehicle 
lane flows, docks and boarding areas, automation systems for speeding-up boarding 
flows, OCR cameras to control transit of passenger / vehicles through the boarding 
areas giving the real-time status of the boarding process and detecting unauthorized 
access. ABCs are essentially modular systems that are easily implemented and provide 
for operational efficiency increase. FRONTEX has released a practical handbook with 
generic requirements (FRONTEX, 2012) for the ABC systems which follows the 
requirements imposed by the “Schengen Handbook” (European Commission, 2006) 
and makes several technical recommendations regarding automation of border 
controls for passenger traffic.  
Gate systems and automated access control systems ensure cost effective and quick 
boarding operations, however, on the other hand they are more prone to cyber 
related security risks.  
2.2 ABCs within the PCSs 
Ports around Europe and beyond have been redefining their position on the value 
chain. Ports are modernizing their service offerings, contributing to improved visibility 
and sharing various information across supply chain actors. The PCSs that are currently 
being built offer such visibility throughout the chain and act as Single Windows (United 
Nations, 2003). According to the International Port Community Systems Association 
(International Port Community Systems Association, 2012), PCSs “can, and will, play a 
major role as Europe moves towards the Single Window concept”.  
A PCS is an extension of the traditional, oftentimes uni-dimensional, Enterprise 
Resource Planning System (Morrall, Rainbird, Katsoulakos, Koliousis, & Varelas, 2016), 
offering connectivity among multiple systems operated by different organizations and 
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authorities. PCSs work on a distributed logic and are based on databases that belong 
to either private or public bodies. It can be easily understood that these systems 
contain sensitive information in terms of commercial data and public authorities’ 
inspection results among others. Thus modern ports are not striving only to build 
these systems but more importantly to safeguard the information contained in these 
systems.  
Based on feedback from the participating Port Facility Security Officers (PFSOs) (Port 
Facility Security Officer, 2016) Table 1 below was compiled. This table presents the 
needs for each terminal, based on the characteristics of the transportation flow. It is 
understood that although ABC systems are necessary for all types of port terminals 
where passengers need be transited in a seamless flow manner (i.e. cruise and ROPAX 
terminals), ports can take much more advantage of the ABC systems and use them for 
monitoring people access in general, including real-time background checks across a 
number of databases (e.g. Watch List, Schengen, FBI, Visa, Trusted Traveller and APIS). 
For example a cruise ship disembarking 3,000 passengers in less than an hour makes 
the existence and usage of an ABC System compulsory.  





Passengers Workers Seamen  Vehicles 
Cargo Terminal   X X  
Car Terminal   X X X 
Container Terminal   X X X 
Oil Terminal   X X  
Ro-Pax Terminal  X X X X X 
Cruise Terminal X  X X  
Source: Validation workshop (Port Facility Security Officer, 2016) 
2.3 A model PCS architecture with ABC 
Considering the functional and business requirements of modern ports, it is easily 
understood that the need for automation may be implemented from passenger 
control to cargo control as well. A small number of ports in the European Union 
(CONTAIN Consortium, 2011), (SUPPORT Consortium, 2010) have tested automated 
gates for cargo, in order to improve both the security of cargo transiting and/or 
transferring through their facilities and reduce the waiting time for trucks and cargo. 
These gates follow similar functional properties as ABC systems do for passengers. 
The following Figure 2 presents a conceptual architecture for the PCS where the 
automated control systems including passenger (ABCs and wireless-ABCs) and cargo 
(automated cargo gates) are constituent modular elements. 
Page 9 | 37 
 
Figure 2 - A model PCS Architecture incorporating ABC 
The PCS includes several Relational Databases (RDBs) that store and handle the 
relevant data. In terms of border control and/or access control automation, the PCS 
mainframe communicates with the local port terminal server that handles the 
automated systems (ABCs, Gates) through the PA’s communications network. 
Additionally, the PCS communicates and shares data with the Competent 
Authority(ies), CAs. From the information flow point of view, once a ship announces a 
call (for example through sending a pre-arrival notice), it sends at the same time all 
relevant information to the PA and waits for instructions. For example, a cruise ship, 
submits the passenger list and the crew list. The PA communicates with the relevant 
CAs for entry approvals and/or rejections. Once this document is ready, the 
passengers are ready for disembarkation and when passing through the ABCs, they 
are granted access, rejected or wait for further inspections / instructions. This part of 
the process is the most risk prone, since compromised information may lead to 
unauthorized access to people/personnel.   
The PCS plays a central role in this architecture, being the moderator of the 
information sharing as well as performing support services for both cyber & physical 
security inspections and control. The ABC component improves the inspections in 
terms of number, duration and effectiveness. This equipment may undertake a more 
inclusive monitoring role, not only for international movements which has been so far 
the main objective but also for domestic movements, similarly to other industries like 
the airline industry. It may also be extended to all stakeholders moving in and out of 
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and reactive monitoring activities. Although the ABC component is an exposed system 
(in terms of risk management), nevertheless, the proposed framework considers such 
threats. 
From Figure 2 above, it is well understood that although the systems have 
incorporated certain risk mitigation measures (for example firewalls and xml 
communications to reduce DB exposure, etc.) there are blackspots and weak links, 
since (a) infrastructure-wise, the distributed nature of the ABCs and Gate Controls 
expose part of the system to higher risks especially to outsiders and (b) process-wise, 
there is an increased need to implement and execute stricter and more robust security 
processes regarding the risk mitigation. It is self-explanatory that these systems are 
zero tolerance systems and additionally, unplanned / unforeseen downtime is an 
undesirable event. 
2.4 ABCs for passenger terminals  
Port facility security is important and should be done by specially trained personnel 
with the appropriate skills. The main challenges include the development of a viable 
port wide Security Plan (SP) that enforces access control at the different port areas 
and terminals and locks out undesired access and entrance (indicatively, illegal 
immigration, trespassing, etc). Additionally, the SP should also identify a port’s critical 
infrastructural elements and also identify the current and the future traffic in and out 
of the port (in terms of passengers, crew, cargo and broadly defined stakeholders). 
The access control and the security, according to the ISPS Code, is rather critical and 
for many ports that handle international flows, this has to be effectively connected 
with border control systems. 
Inefficient boarding systems, especially manual systems, leave passengers and ferry 
cruise operators dissatisfied. Port terminals need optimization of the boarding process 
(planning and execution) and the right mix of boarding systems, devices and 
procedures is essential. ISPS rules and regulations make mandatory the adoption of 
security and monitoring systems for both accessing the port facility and transiting 
through the boarding areas. Only passengers and vehicles with a valid boarding pass 
can access boarding areas, and their transit must be monitored real-time by using fast 
and flexible tools. The following provide an overview of essential security subsystems, 
based on the FRONTEX requirements (FRONTEX, 2012): 
 Gate Systems: Gate systems and automated access control systems ensure 
cost effective and quick boarding operations for freight, cars and passengers. 
For Ports, the gate system can be implemented in the boarding area. 
 Self Service Systems: Complete self-check-in solutions including full function 
kiosks as well as a wide range of high performance options and touch-screen 
applications. These are implemented in the check-in area of the port.  
 Ship Boarding Systems: A solution that provides complete automation of 
vehicles check-in and check-out during the embarkation and disembarkation 
operations as well as passenger boarding automation. 
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 Mobile Systems: mobile applications that enable port operators to validate 
tickets, check-in passengers and print boarding cards directly on the dock, 
during the embarkation process.  
 Passenger Information Systems (PIS): PIS provide passengers boarding 
information through different information channels and to different 
stakeholders (immigration, border police, customs, etc).  
 Document Authentication Systems (DAS): Document authentication is the 
process by which Electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents (e-MRTD) 
presented by the traveller are checked and verified. Document 
Authentication Systems (DAS) determine whether the travel documents are 
genuine, whether the holder is the true and lawful owner and that s/he is not 
a threat to the state through optical document checks, e-Passport 
verification, etc. 
3 Procedural Upgrade  
3.1 Framework components 
In this proposed framework, information security is defined by four components in 
terms of information compromise type, namely confidentiality, integrity, authenticity 
and availability. Risk management techniques ensure that none of these is violated, in 
order to use information as non-compromised. This work uses a simple definition for 
these components. More precisely, confidentiality is herein defined as the 
information that is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, 
entities or processes. Integrity is defined as the information accuracy and 
completeness including the ability to prove an action or event took place, so that it is 
repudiated again. Authenticity is the origin of the information which has been 
identified and validated. Last but not least, availability is defined as the accessibility 
of information and the usability upon demand by an authorized entity. Risk 
assessment is herein defined as the process to identify threats and assess the risks 
which can compromise any of the four abovementioned components. 
In terms of physical security, similarly, four major components are identified and these 
include asset definition, threat assessment, vulnerability analysis and security 
measures selection. Asset definition includes not only the recognition of the asset but 
also the identification of the specificities and the prioritization compared to their 
organizational criticality. Threat assessment is the identification and the examination 
of potential risks and vulnerability analysis identifies the specific limitations / 
weaknesses each asset has compared to the identified threats which defines the 
compromise that could trigger the risk / threat. Finally, security measures are 
identified and selected based on the threat and vulnerability analysis. The main 
objective of physically securing a port facility is to develop a premise that has been 
specifically engineered with systems that either reduce the number of threats or 
minimize the impacts of the vulnerabilities. 
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3.2 High level overview of port related threats  
Based on the previous analysis, four port main assets were identified and used. More 
precisely, this study covers the physical infrastructure, which includes all port facilities 
like terminal facilities, warehouses, parking areas, manufacturing areas. Additionally, 
it covers the ICT infrastructure, including networks, ICT related hardware 
systems/equipment, as well as systems and software, including servers, RDBs and 
subsystems like port services (e.g. cargo management, reservation, navigation) hosted 
by the PCS systems. Last but not least the framework covers, the information and the 
electronic data itself, including information, database content, log files and log books. 
A matrix of possible threats has been developed. This matrix aims at capturing the 
four abovementioned categories of assets and their respective vulnerabilities. These 
threats may be used by the PFSOs to (a) improve security, (b) improve auditing of 
security processes and systems with an enterprise wide support and (c) fuse relevant 
knowledge to all involved stakeholders. Indicatively, the threat / vulnerability 
assessment includes malicious human activity related threats, physical attacks from 
outside the port perimeter, weather conditions (heavy winds, severe cold, heat waves, 
rain, etc) that may cause disruption of (ABC) systems’ operation, physical disasters, 
unauthorized access in areas based on access rights permissions, inadequate 
equipment and materials as well as inadequate or incapable access control and 
authentications processes, cyber-attacks that affect the availability of information 
(DDOS attacks, Trojans, etc.) and last but not least improper execution and 
documentation of processes and procedures.  
Table 2 below shows the number of threats that the matrix contains per type of asset. 
These threats were primarily based on ISPS standards as well as on the ISO 27000 
standard and were validated during a workshop with five PFSOs (Port Facility Security 
Officer, 2016). Although the number may seem large, the number of the terminals, 
the essence of the infrastructure, the operational and the business rules necessitate 
this number. Additionally, it has to be noted that all these threats are pertinent to the 
ABC procedures proposed herein, however, they are non-exhaustive. An indicative list 
of these threats along with indicative vulnerabilities are both presented in Table 4 in 
Annex I as an explanatory breakdown per asset type.  
Table 2 - Number of threats identified by Type of Asset 
Type of Asset 
Number of Threats 
Identified 
(Cyber & Physical) 
ICT Infrastructure 165 
Information and electronic data 283 
Physical Infrastructure 1,482 
Software 155 
Grand Total  2,085 
 
The analysis of a security risk depends upon the threats and the vulnerabilities that 
comprise each. For example, the risk level of a particular asset to a specific threat 
increases as the impact and the vulnerability levels are increased. For example the 
firewalls in the PCS architecture (see Figure 1) are not configured properly 
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(vulnerability), non-authorized access (threat)  of the PCS  ABC (asset) is most likely to 
occur causing dangerous consequences (threat with high impact) to  the whole PCS 
because there is no access monitoring device (vulnerability). In this case we conclude 
that the risk of the ABC, if the threat of non-authorized access occurs, is high. 
3.3 Port security risk management methodology  
The proposed framework addresses the ports’ critical infrastructure security 
holistically by combining the ISPS Code with common ICT security management 
standards as stated above. This procedure meets established requirements like the 
ISO 9000 family of standards, (International Standardization Organization, 2009), 
(International Standardization Organization, 2008), the ISO 27000 family of standards, 
(International Standardization Organization, 2005), the ISO 31000 family of standards, 
(International Standardization Organization, 2009) as well as regulated standards like 
the ISPS Code (International Maritime Organization, 2012), the IMO Provisions 
(International Maritime Organization, 2002) and the SOLAS Convention (Lloyd’s 
Register Rulefinder, 2005). This proposed methodology considers cultural, port 
industry practice and compliance aspects and involved a thorough analysis of risk 
templates and risk matrices for the five participating ports. The analysis was also 
compared to available risk consultants’ Threat and Vulnerability Assessments (TVA) 
recommendations. The process to identify and validate the risks follows a taxonomy-
based risk identification methodology which breaks down possible risk sources, 
selects the appropriate and adapts to the port industry. 
 Additionally, the framework has a multi-scope perspective in supporting risk analysis 
on the physical layer, on the cyber layer and on a combined layer. In this respect, it 
ensures collaboration among all ICT port stakeholders building up collective 
intelligence for the entire community and analyses sectoral, interconnected and 
interdependent threats by evaluating both direct and indirect risks. The proposed 
framework intends to improve security accuracy and implementation flexibility.  
In this context, it is noted that compliance with ISPS requirements is obligatory. The 
company/ship/port develops, implements and maintains the SP which addresses, at 
the very least, the requirements laid down by ISPS. The SP is then approved by the CA. 
Indicatively, ISPS recognizes 3 Security Levels. Security level 1 is the normal level with 
minimum security measures maintained, for example the port facility only enforces 
“no access” areas. Security level 2 has higher security requirements compared to the 
normal level. Routine and cargo operations are carried out as in normal cases but with 
elevated security measures (controls, checks, monitoring, and surveillance). Security 
level 3 is enabled when an imminent danger is identified and specific protective 
measures are maintained. Operations are stopped and frequent security duties are 
carried out. 
The first step of the risk management methodology was to develop a security 
awareness process. This comprises of a clear definition of an activities’ framework, an 
agenda for robustly identifying the port security (awareness) level and finally of the 
development of an exhaustive list of all physical and cyber assets of the port and their 
interdependencies. The second step is the recognition and the establishment of a risk 
analysis framework which comprises of several interrelated sub-activities. The 
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identification of the physical and the cyber threats that the port facilities face as well 
the cyber threats targeting the PCS systems themselves comes first. Then comes the 
identification of external threats (existing and potential) that arise from external 
interdependent entities (e.g. customs, maritime companies, logistics service 
providers) and finally comes the calculation of the impact levels of the identified 
threats. The development of a set of vulnerabilities based on the identified threats 
follows along with the calculation of the risks for each asset and each threat 
individually and collectively. The final step is the categorization of the risks into 
internal and external per port asset which concludes this methodology. 
The initial validation was further evaluated at a second level through a peer review 
group that was set up, comprising of Port Security Officers (Port Facility Security 
Officer, 2016). 
3.4 Procedural Flows 
3.4.1 Threat and vulnerability assessment 
Stakeholders carry out risk analysis of the events as required by the implemented risk 
management plan and based on a security threat assessment procedure which is set 
up to identify and quantify the potential threats. This study uses the Bow-Tie method 
(Gifford, Giltert, & Bernes, 2003) to conduct risk identification and risk analysis 
concurrently for a number of different events. This method effectively combines Fault 
Tree Analysis, Causal Factors Charting and Event Tree Analysis. The Bow-Tie 
methodology presents a central loss event, the threats that may cause that loss event, 
the consequences of that loss event occurring and the possible controls that may be 
used to reduce the probability of the loss event occurring.   
Figure 3 below shows a practical example the validation workshop used in order to 
identify the threats and perform risk analysis for the specific event of “Passenger List 
content not matching the list submitted to the outgoing port”. The terminology is 
based on the CONTAIN project (CONTAIN Consortium, 2011). Specifically a Loss Event 
(LE) is defined as one of several identifications of related threats. A Threat (T) is a 
danger that once triggered produces harmful consequences. Proactive Control (PC) is 
an action that may lessen a threat from occurring. A Reactive Control (RC) is an action 
or a set of actions after a threat has actually occurred and Consequence (S) is defined 
as the extent of harm caused by a threat.  
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3.4.2 Indicative information flow plan and data fusion 
Figure 4 below represents the exchange of messages among the stakeholders when 
sharing the passenger list. This diagram shares the basic principles described in Figure 
3 above and includes all related authorities, agents, companies, etc.  
 
Figure 4 - Information flow overview, port TVA subsystem viewpoint 
The system presented herein exchanges short messages on a Machine-to-Machine 
basis and each sub-system stores the data for analysis and risk management / 
analytics. Furthermore, depending on the content, the proposed system is scalable to 
accommodate longer messages. 
3.5 Knowledge Upgrade  
One of the most important feedback that emerged from the validation workshop (Port 
Facility Security Officer, 2016) is the need for a knowledge management system. This 
system should capture the essential information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, 
risks and risk management approaches and store it. The proposed platform contained 
a simple web-based, open-source KM system in the form of Content Management 
System. The reason for adopting such a system was mainly as a proof of concept. In a 
real life case, more advanced systems add value by improving the entire knowledge 
management process. The proposed system offered a number of critical services like 
capturing knowledge at the individual level (experiences, known faults, known issues, 
threat descriptions, etc), distributing knowledge on-demand at the organizational 
level as well as across similar access rights offices. Additionally, the proposed system 











Real Time sensing data
(ABC/ Pass Control)
Real Time data exchange
Real Time sensing data
(Localization)  
Real Time sensing data
(External Sources)











Page 17 | 37 
and set up hotline services, to answer questions as soon as possible and also comment 
individually per message. In addition, an enterprise wide portal was set up to 
aggregate security content and share information across the organizations which was 
also coupled with an eLearning module accommodating simple explainer and 
situational videos. This is a top-down approach in regulating information sharing 
offering robust KM usage.  
The proposed KM system couldn’t support, by default, real time interactions, 
however, by using open-source off-the-shelf systems, it increased satisfaction among 
workshop participants and improved insight. Feedback from the validation workshop 
included utilizing more advanced systems, including semantic KM systems as well as 
further exploring the utility of Serious Games and gamification based training.  
4 Port Security Officers’ Validation and Feedback 
As discussed above, during a one day workshop, a validation of the proposed 
framework was performed based on structured discussions and feedback from the 
participants representing five ports.   
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Table 3 below describes the general characteristics of the ports participating in the 
validation workshop as well as the respective validation workshop participants’ 
characteristics and background / experience. It has to be mentioned that the selected 
ports are indicative and not representative, for the initial validation purposes. The 
participation on behalf of the ports included either the PFSO or the Deputy PFSO. A 
significant part of the TVA matrices were co-developed with the participating ports, 
thus anonymity for security reasons is preserved.  The questionnaire appears on 
ANNEX II and was based on the usability test proposed by Lin, Choong and Salvendy’s 
(Lin, Choong, & Salvendy, 1997) and on the usefulness test developed by Lund (Lund, 
2001). 
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Table 3 - Validation workshop participants' characteristics including port characteristics 












1 Small Cruise, ROPAX 200,000 20,000 N/A N/A Public PFSO  Ex Police Enforcement,  
 25 years of security experience, 5 
or more in this position 
 Qualified PFSO 





300, 000 (cruise, home 
porting) 
9,000, 000 (ferry traffic) 
7, 000, 000 (pure ROPAX) 
300,000 400,000 4,000,000 Mixed Deputy PFSO  Managerial background (within 
the port) 
 Qualified PFSO 
 5 years or more in position 




800,000 700,000 100,000 4,000,000 Mixed Deputy PFSO  Ex Police Enforcement,  
 30 years of security experience, 5 
years or more in this position 
 Qualified PFSO 
4 Medium RORO, ROPAX, 
General 
600,000 300,000 200,000 - Public PFSO  Ex Military,  
 25 years of security experience, 5 
years or more in this position 
 Qualified PFSO 
5 Medium RORO, ROPAX, 
Container 
2,000,000 500,000 400,000 800,000 Public PFSO  Managerial Background (within 
the port),  
 6 years of security experience 
(position related) 
 Qualified PFSO 
N.B.: Numbers rounded by author to preserve anonymity
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The analysis of the validation workshop resulted in some interesting conclusions. A 
broad range of definitions and security concepts was observed, however, PFSOs seem 
to give particular attention to physical security (safety), oftentimes tacitly ignoring the 
four components of cyber security, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and 
availability. Although all participating ports were ISPS compliant, covering effectively 
the safety component within the ports, it was understood that the security standard 
approach is not holistic in terms of risks identified, assessed, and mitigated. The 
absence of a comprehensive security culture favoured a focus on physical inspections 
which draws on from the enforcement background of most security officers. 
None of the ports presented an exhaustive TVA, although sporadic measures and best 
practices were identified by all PFSOs. Similarly, the ports surveyed have only recently 
started coping with cyber threats (e.g. attacks, masquerading identities, network 
traffic monitoring, theft /modification of personal data), however, they identified the 
lack of a comprehensive and exhaustive risk matrix, where they could include and 
utilize best practices and “how-to” solutions. It is evident that the value of information 
security is not entirely realized as a core constituent of the business model and of the 
business offering, thus it is overlooked.  
Another interesting observation is that Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) planning 
standards or methodologies are not sufficiently implemented. Most importantly, 
there is no effective classification methodology to categorize the criticality of the port 
assets nor of the port facilities. This is attributed partly to the lack of an appropriate 
legislation framework and partly to limited standardization initiatives. The reporting 
framework put in place from the CAs seems weak compared to the value of the asset 
and doesn’t provide adequate knowledge sharing between authorities. This issue was 
also raised as part of the reporting and/or feedback procedures on security incidents 
to the CAs. The reporting focuses only on aggregate statistics mainly of physical 
incidents and doesn’t cover in sufficient detail cyber incidents. Furthermore, the 
existing procedures don’t effectively report lessons learned nor develop (or store) any 
other knowledge content. Procedurally, the collaboration among ports, stakeholders 
and authorities is based only on individual relations and initiatives and don’t utilize 
robust, explicit KM creation mechanisms. Interestingly, the interviewees also 
considered useful the practice of insurance coverage other industries adopt, 
particularly the information security losses insurance contracts as part of a holistic 
mitigation plan. 
With respect to the technology element, the participants claimed that plans to install 
diverse technologies, from access control systems (e.g. smart cards, ABC, RFIDs) to 
access awareness (e.g. firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc) are put in place. 
Additionally, the ports are also planning to improve the training for cyber security 
threats for ports and critical infrastructure. All of these systems will be greatly 
supported by a more extensive use of ABCs. ABC’s parallel background procedures and 
their capabilities to more effectively share information is an interesting option that 
will be further explored in the near future.  
Based on the discussions, the proposed system has the flexibility to become a 
centralized security database containing knowledge on the threats, the vulnerabilities 
and the risk management approaches used by all stakeholders. The use will be based 
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on access rights permissions. It is self-evident that this knowledge has to be 
appropriately shared across all relevant stakeholders.  The use of the PCS as the 
backbone KM system, either centralized or decentralized, was well received by all 
interviewees. The horizontal deployment and the inclusive character of both internal 
and external stakeholders offers significant value to more effectively manage the port 
risks.   
With regards to the ABC proof of concept validation some interesting conclusions 
were drawn. Notably, ABCs should be placed in various locations of the port, including 
on the ship, in arrival/departure areas, in warehouses, in ports’ entry/exit points. The 
number and the deployment of the ABCs should ensure that controls are carried out 
quickly and efficiently, minimizing turnaround duration. The operational attributes 
should also be adjusted to the local elements and restrictions, for example indoor ABC 
gates, mobile ABC gates, portable devices to act as ABCs and to be administered by 
enforcement / patrol officers as well as large Automated Cargo Gates (ACGs) for 
vehicles, wagons and  containers. All participating PFSOs agreed that ABC may 
improve both the efficiency and the effectiveness of the inspections for all incoming 
persons, as it has the flexibility to perform 100% monitoring and inspections. This gives 
a unique opportunity to ports to secure the ISPS designated port area.  
A robust cross certification procedure and mechanisms between Country Verifiers 
Certification Authorities (CVCA) should ensure ABC’s interoperability, which should be 
followed by a thorough harmonization of ABCs in all entry points (i.e. railways, roads, 
airports) in order to accelerate the check-in process but most importantly improve the 
information sharing among the stakeholders. This harmonization should also ensure 
the integration of ABCs in the PCS so as to increase the value of information and share 
it appropriately to all stakeholders.  
Conclusively, the most important insight drawn was the lack of a comprehensive 
security management plan, since most of the PFSOs draw on their enforcement 
background, giving attention primarily to physical security management without cross 
referencing of the background of each security item. However, modern ports are also 
information hubs, where security management has to effectively implement, 
establish, assess, monitor, improve and audit both the physical and the cyber security 
elements of the ports’ facilities (assets). Additionally, security management is a 
continuous and systematic process of identifying, analysing, mitigating, reporting and 
monitoring technical, operational and other types of security risks (both physical and 
cyber risks) as well as implementing appropriate security measures and controls.  
All ports are compliant with the regulations required by CAs however, the workshop 
session made clear that the CA’s framework doesn’t require a comprehensive analysis 
of security measures in order to protect Critical Port Infrastructure. The current 
regulatory context of the ISPS maintains a generic consideration on cyber security 
elements and remains with the PA to adopt a stricter security plan. Towards this 
direction EU (European Commission, 2010) adopted a more information targeted 
policy framework, in the context of Action 94 (eMaritime) of the Digital Agenda for 
EU.  
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5 Synthesis of results, conclusions and further research 
Conclusively, although PAs and operators are compliant with the regulations required 
by CAs (e.g. IMO, EU), nevertheless, our analysis revealed that there are opportunities 
for improvement. For example, in order to improve security efficiency and 
effectiveness, ABC systems may be implemented. This system will greatly benefit from 
sharing information through the PCSs, which could improve both the front-end quality 
perception (e.g. reduce waiting times) and also improve the security level as well as 
significantly reduce unauthorized access. Compared to the currently available 
frameworks, the proposed system introduces a more exhaustive analysis of security 
threats and risks to the Ports’ Infrastructure, including the Critical Information 
Infrastructure and additionally utilizes advanced equipment to monitor unauthorized 
access, share information and introduce analytics to increase situational awareness 
for the security operators.  
Furthermore, the state-of-play analysis showed that cyber security threats are not 
adequately covered and remain at the PA’s discretion to adopt a stricter and more 
inclusive security plan. Port facility security awareness needs to be improved also 
through provision of appropriate cyber security training to relevant actors (e.g.  
internal and external users), awareness campaigns and training initiatives, while their 
provision could be coordinated by relevant cyber security organizations (e.g. PFSOs, 
maritime authorities, national certification authorities, public-private partnerships, 
etc).  
Nevertheless, in order for a proper ABC system to be installed, not only the physical 
features, but most importantly the soft characteristics of the ports have to be assessed 
and modified accordingly. Compared to the state-of-play, the proposed framework is 
capable of handling security information and fusing this information to the proper 
handler (including public and private entities) in a timely manner so as to execute 
more efficiently and more effectively the inspections. Additionally, the proposed 
framework supports effectively a risk management system not only by combining 
different information sources but also by supporting different security philosophies. 
This study in not exhaustive, but intends to become a basis of discussions on how to 
further improve the security level in ports, terminals and generally critical 
infrastructure. More importantly, in recognizing the limitations of this paper, 
additional research has to be carried out in terms of (a) measuring the impact of 
introducing this framework, including cost benefit analysis, economic impacts, 
security impacts, (b) understanding the value of semantic technologies in improving 
the inspections and (c) improving the information sharing standards.  
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7 Nomenclature 
ABC Automated Border Control 
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ACG Automated Cargo Gate 
BoL Bill of Lading 
B2A Business to Authority 
B2B Business to Business 
CA Competent Authority 
CVCA Country Verifiers Certification Authorities 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
ISPS Code International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
KM Knowledge Management 
PA Port Authority 
RDB Relational Database 
ROPAX Roll On – Passenger Ship 
RORO Roll On – Roll off Ship 
PCS Port Community System 
PFSO Port Facility Security Officer 
SSO Ship Security Officer 
TVA Threat and Vulnerability Assessments 
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ANNEX  I – Indicative Threats & Vulnerabilities  
Table 4 – Indicative Threats & Vulnerabilities by type of asset 
Asset Type Threats  Vulnerabilities 
ICT Infrastructure Technical failures Dusty equipment  
ICT Infrastructure 
Electronic Interference 
& Cyber Interference 
Electromagnetic radiation 
ICT Infrastructure Hurricane 
No business continuity plans or procedures for 
recovery of information and information assets 
ICT Infrastructure Electric surge Backup files and systems not available 
ICT Infrastructure Equipment Failure Inadequate change control settings 
ICT Infrastructure Theft and Fraud Uncontrolled copy of software 
ICT Infrastructure Fire 
Inadequate Physical and Environmental Security Policy 
and Procedures 
ICT Infrastructure Storm 
Location is in an area highly susceptible to natural 
disasters 
ICT Infrastructure Power Fluctuations 
Improper or inappropriate maintenance of technical 
facilities 
ICT Infrastructure Cyber security failure Worm threats 
Information and 
electronic data 
Equipment Failure Not adequate policy for critical equipment 
Information and 
electronic data 
Communications Failure  Communication lines without protection 
Information and 
electronic data 
Files incidents Uncontrolled copies of sensitive files 
Information and 
electronic data 
Procedural Failures Lack of usage policies (Cyber Attacks) 
Information and 
electronic data 
Fire Lack of fire detection devices 
Information and 
electronic data 
Storm Location is in an area susceptible to natural disasters 
Information and 
electronic data 





Inadequate engineering and quality processes for 
design and code review 
Information and 
electronic data 
Sabotage Lack of Physical Security 
Information and 
electronic data 
Cyber security failure 




Masquerade Inadequate identity and password policy 
Information and 
electronic data 
Eavesdropping Unencrypted communications 
Physical 
Infrastructure 




No business continuity plans or procedures for 
recovery of information and information assets 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Terrorist attacks Lack of Logical Access security 
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Physical 
Infrastructure 
Port Facility Incidents  
The port’s surroundings are not clearly communicated 
to personnel  
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Inspections at the gates 
– searches failures 
There is no equipment for inspecting passengers 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Berthing area failures  
There are no procedures to search waterfront areas 
for explosives or other dangerous devices prior to a 
ship arrival at PF or waterfronts that have been 
unmanned or unmonitored 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Cyber security failure 




Training, control and 
supervision failures 
There is no training on body searching 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Training, control and 
supervision failures 
There is no training on luggage inspection 
Physical 
Infrastructure 
Training, control and 
supervision failures 
There is no training on vehicle inspection 
Software Fire Inadequate monitoring of environmental  conditions 
Software 
Storm 
Back-up files and systems are kept at the same place / 
premises also prone to storms 
Software 
Power Fluctuations 
Location is in an area susceptible to power 
fluctuations 
Software Cyber security failure Easily accessible devices (servers, mainframes, etc). 
Software Malicious Code Lack of policy for opening email attachments 
Software Denial of Service Lack of a Firewall / No regular updates 
n.b.: Vulnerabilities are generic to preserve port anonymity and commercially sensitive 
information. Sampled elements; not exhaustive, representative. Realistic vulnerabilities.  
 
  
Page 30 | 37 
ANNEX  II – Workshop Questionnaire  
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